

## Message Text

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INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: TU, GR, PFOR

SUBJECT: TURKISH AID STATEMENT BY VANCE AND BALL

FOR SECRETARY AND SISCO

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY GEORGE W. BALL  
AND CYRUS R. VANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. WASHINGTON, DC,  
JULY 10, 1975.

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BEGIN TEXT:

IN DECIDING WHAT MODIFICATION, IF ANY, SHOULD BE MADE IN  
THE PROVISIONS REGARDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

WHICH HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE LAST FEBRUARY 5, THIS COMMITTEE FACES SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT MUST TRY TO FASHION A COURSE OF ACTION THAT WILL ACHIEVE AT LEAST FOUR MAJOR OBJECTIVES:

FIRST, ENCOURAGE GREECE AND TURKEY TO MOVE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS OFF DEAD CENTER SO THAT THEIR DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GREEK AND TURKISH COMMUNITIES ON CYPRUS, CAN BE PERMANENTLY SETTLED.

SECOND, PRESERVE THE PRINCIPLES UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS SUPPLIED, BY GRANT OR SALE, OVER \$70 BILLION OF ARMS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD DURING THE LAST

THREE DECADES AND AVOID SETTING A PRECEDENT THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE AGGRESSIVE USE OF THOSE ARMS BY ANY GRANTEE OR PURCHASER.

THIRD, RESTORE THE VITALITY OF NATO, AND PARTICULARLY ITS SOUTHERN WING, WHICH HAS SUFFERED SEVERE DETERIORATION AS A RESULT OF THE GREEK-TURKISH QUARREL.

FOURTH, PRESERVE AMERICAN BASES AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS, BOTH IN GREECE AND TURKEY, WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF ITS NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIES.

WE BOTH APPEAR HERE THIS AFTERNOON AS PRIVATE CITIZENS, REPRESENTING NO ONE BUT OURSELVES. ANY SPECIAL CREDENTIALS ARE LIMITED PRIMARILY TO THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BOTH HAD EXPERIENCE ON BEHALF OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH EARLIER PHASES OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WHICH IS THE CENTRAL AREA OF DISPUTE. WE HAVE INDIVIDUALLY DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM INFORMALLY WITH ACQUAINTANCES IN THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS AND ONE OF US HAS TALKED WITH BOTH PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS OF GREECE AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT OF TURKEY WITHIN RECENT MONTHS. HOWEVER,  
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WE ARE NOT PRIVY TO THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC OR TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OR TO FACTS NOT AVAILABLE TO ANY INFORMED AMERICAN WHO FOLLOWS THE UNFOLDING OF THIS DRAMA IN THE NEWSPAPERS.

WE SHALL TRY TO CONFINE OUR COMMENTS THIS AFTERNOON TO THE ISSUES IMMEDIATELY FACING THE COMMITTEE. EACH OF US HAS IN THE PAST EXPRESSED VIEWS REGARDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS AFFAIR WAS HANDLED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DURING ITS INITIAL PHASES THAT TOOK PLACE JUST A YEAR AGO. BUT ALL THAT IS MOOT. THE PROBLEM NOW BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE IS IMMEDIATE AND PRACTICAL AND WE SHALL LEAVE THE AUTOPSY OF PAST EVENTS TO FUTURE HISTORIANS.

ALTHOUGH THIS COMMITTEE MUST NECESSARILY FOCUS ON THE CURRENT GREECE-TURKEY DISPUTE, THE ISSUES INVOLVED GO WELL BEYOND THE CONTROVERSY TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF AMERICAN SALES AND GRANTS OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. THAT IS A PRACTICE WHICH BEGAN IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, HAS MOUNTED TO ALARMING PROPORTIONS.

IN THE BEGINNING, AMERICA PROVIDED ARMS PRIMARILY TO ENLIST COUNTRIES IN A COMMON EFFORT TO STOP THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM; THUS, FOR SOME YEARS THE EMPHASIS WAS ON

PERSUADING COUNTRIES TO BECOME OUR ALLIES RATHER THAN NEUTRALISTS. LATER, AS THE SOVIET UNION BECAME ITSELF A MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER, THE PRACTICE ACQUIRED COMPETITIVE OR PREEMPTIVE OVERTONES. STILL LATER, WE LARGELY SHIFTED OUR EFFORT FROM GRANTS TO THE SALE OF ARMS, PRIMARILY IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE THEN CHRONIC DEFICIT IN THE UNITED STATES' BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.

IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT OUR WORRYING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO EXPAND ITS ARMS SALES, IT HAS ONLY BEEN IN THE LAST TWO YEARS THAT SALES AND GRANTS OF ARMS HAVE TAKEN A QUANTUM JUMP. UNTIL 1973 THEY REMAINED IN THE AREA OF \$3 TO \$4 BILLION A YEAR, BUT IN 1974 THE FIGURE LEAPED TO \$8.2  
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BILLION, AND THIS FISCAL YEAR IT IS LIKELY TO GO TO \$8.5 BILLION FOR SALES ALONE AND, WE UNDERSTAND, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS \$11 BILLION FOR BOTH SALES AND GRANTS.

THESE ARE DISTURBING FIGURES WHEN IT IS REALIZED THAT A LARGE PART OF THESE ARMS ARE BEING SUPPLIED TO COUNTRIES IN AREAS OF THE WORLD MARKED BY LOCAL TENSIONS AND CONFLICT -- PARTICULARLY THE MIDDLE EAST. IN FACT, IT TAKES AN OPTIMIST TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MASSIVE AMOUNT OF HARDWARE CAN BE INJECTED INTO AN OVERHEATED AREA WITHOUT THE STRONG PROBABILITY THAT, SOONER OR LATER, SOME NATION WILL DECIDE TO USE SOME OF IT.

OUR ONE SAFEGUARD IS THAT MOST OF THESE ARMS ARE PROVIDED UNDER EXPLICIT CONDITIONS THAT THEY WILL BE USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY ARE EXPLICITLY PROVIDED, WHICH ARE SOLELY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE AND TO PERMIT THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY TO PARTICIPATE IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER -- WHICH, OF COURSE, INCLUDES NATO. BUT THAT RAISES THE CENTRAL QUESTION: HOW CAN WE PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THESE CONDITIONS IF WE ARE

PREPARED TO IGNORE THEM IN THE CASE OF TURKEY IN A HIGHLY  
VISIBLE SITUATION WHICH ALL THE WORLD IS WATCHING?

THAT TURKEY USED THE ARMS WE PROVIDED IN VIOLATION OF THE  
RELEVANT AMERICAN LAWS AND OF THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF  
THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT THAT GOVERNED THEIR TRANSFER IS  
NOT IN DISPUTE. THAT ISSUE HAS BEEN SETTLED BY AN OPIN-  
ION OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL IN UNEQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE.

THE QUESTION NOW IS: SHOULD THE CONGRESS WIPE OUT THE  
PENALTIES OF VIOLATION WHICH, IN EXPRESS TERMS, WOULD  
RENDER TURKEY INELIGIBLE FOR FURTHER AMERICAN WEAPONS  
UNTIL THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TAKES STEPS TO PURGE ITSELF

BY SOME SERIOUS MOVE TO SETTLE ITS DISPUTE WITH GREECE AND  
TO REMOVE ITS TROOPS FROM CYPRUS? TO DO SO MIGHT DANGER-  
OUSLY UNDERCUT THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE IMPOSED ON THE USE  
OF ALL THE ARMS WE HAVE PROVIDED UP TO THIS POINT UNDER  
OUR VARIOUS MILITARY AID AND MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS.  
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THAT TURKEY MUST MAKE SOME MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO  
CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR LONG-TERM STABILITY IN CYPRUS  
SEEMS EVIDENT. THE TURKS INVADED CYPRUS WITH A MILITARY  
FORCE OF, PERHAPS, 40,000 MEN, A LARGE PART OF WHICH IS  
STILL ON THE ISLAND. EVEN AFTER NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN  
STARTED, THEY ENLARGED THEIR BEACHHEAD ON THE ISLAND UNTIL  
THEY NOW OCCUPY SOME 40 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL LAND AREA  
AND A MUCH LARGER PERCENT OF THE ECONOMICALLY VALUABLE  
LAND -- IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTE  
POPULATION IS ONLY ABOUT 18 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL. ALL  
THIS HAS RESULTED IN -- AND IS STILL RESULTING IN -- A  
TRAGIC DISLOCATION IN THE LIVES OF MANY GREEK CYPRIOTES.

OBTAINING, THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT  
-- WITH ITS SENSE OF A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
GREEK CYPRIOTE POPULATION -- CANNOT POSSIBLY TOLERATE AND  
LONG STAY IN OFFICE. YET, IN SPITE OF THE EFFORTS OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL AND PROPOSALS OF GOOD  
OFFICES BY THE UNITED STATES, THE SITUATION REMAINS  
STALEMATED. THE TURKS TAKE THE POSITION THAT THEY WILL  
NOT NEGOTIATE UNTIL THE FLOW OF UNITED STATES ARMS IS  
RENEWED, SINCE THAT WOULD AMOUNT, AS THEY SEE IT, TO  
NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS. WHETHER -- IN VIEW OF THE WEAK-  
NESS AND DIVISION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT -- THEY WOULD  
BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE REASONABLY IF THE ARMS FLOW IS  
RESTORED AND THE PRESSURE IS OFF, IS A MATTER WHICH IT  
MAY BE PRUDENT TO VIEW WITH SOME SKEPTICISM.

THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, FOR ITS PART, IS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE  
FROM THE PEOPLE TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION AND GET ON WITH  
A SETTLEMENT. MANY GREEKS FEEL -- WHETHER RIGHTLY OR

WRONGLY IS A MATTER OF OPINION -- THAT THE UNITED STATES LET THEM DOWN WHEN IT DID NOT DETER TURKEY FROM LAUNCHING AN INVASION, AS IT HAD DONE ON EARLIER OCCASIONS. THIS FEELING IS WIDESPREAD IN GREECE AND HAS EVOKED DEMONSTRATIONS OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT. THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS CUT OFF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO TURKEY HAS BEEN THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT TO OFFSET WHAT MANY GREEKS REGARD AS A PRO-TURKISH "TILT" TO AMERICAN POLICY. THUS, IF CONGRESS WERE NOW TO REVERSE ITS ACTION OF LAST DECEMBER, IT WOULD BE WELL FELT BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND THE GREEK PEOPLE. UNCLASSIFIED

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BER AND LET THE ARMS FLOW TO TURKEY RESUME WITHOUT RELATING IT TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT MIGHT WELL FEEL COMPELLED TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC

OUTRAGE AND FRUSTRATION BY DENYING AMERICA THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE ITS BASES AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS ON GREEK TERRITORY.

OBVIOUSLY, THREATS BY EITHER SIDE TO WITHDRAW FROM NATO OR EVICT AMERICA FROM ITS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN PURELY RATIONAL TERMS. IF THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF NATO, IT IS FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN SECURITY AND THEY MIGHT SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THEIR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS IF THEY CARRIED OUT SUCH THREATS. BUT THIS IS A SITUATION DOMINATED BY PASSION AND PRIDE AND ANCIENT ENMITIES, AND ONE CANNOT EXPECT REACTIONS TO BE COOL AND REASONED.

THIS COMMITTEE IS, OF COURSE, THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THESE FACTS AND WE HAVE TOUCHED ON THEM BRIEFLY ONLY TO INDICATE THE BASIS FOR OUR OWN SUGGESTIONS. THIS IS NOT A SITUATION WHERE THERE ARE ANY EASY OR PAT ANSWERS; IT INVOLVES A BALANCING OF INTERESTS AND CONSIDERATIONS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES ARE HIGHLY SPECULATIVE.

OUR OWN CONCERN, AS IT IS THE CONCERN OF THE COMMITTEE, IS TO SEE ACTION TAKEN THAT BRINGS ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THAT IS POSSIBLE -- WHICH PRESUMABLY MEANS SOME COURSE OF ACTION THAT MINIMIZES THE LOSS OF FACE FOR EITHER SIDE AND YET DOES NOT COMPROMISE PRINCIPLES THAT MAY HAVE IMPORTANCE IN THE MUCH LARGER CONTEXT.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PUT FORWARD A SUGGESTED COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO TURKEY THE \$78 MILLION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES (AND SPARE PARTS) NOW ON ORDER OR IN STORAGE, WHILE PERMITTING THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO MAKE UNLIMITED MILITARY PURCHASES ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS DIRECT FROM UNITED STATES SUPPLIERS. IT DOES NOT

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EXPLICITLY REQUIRE, AS A CONDITION, THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TAKE ANY ACTION WITH REGARD TO CYPRUS OR MAKE ANY MOVE TOWARD THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, IT IS APPARENTLY HOPED THAT, WITH THE TWO ISSUES DISENGAGED, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, FEELING FREE FROM DURESS, WILL VOLUNTARILY SHOW A MORE FLEXIBLE AND SPACIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATION AND THE SOLUTION OF ITS QUARRELS WITH GREECE THAN HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN THE PAST, IN SPITE OF THE WEAKNESS AND DISUNITY AT THE TOP LEVELS OF THE TURKISH POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

IT IS APPARENTLY ALSO FELT THAT, THOUGH THIS SOLUTION WOULD

OBTAIN, OBVIOUSLY NOT BE WELL RECEIVED BY GREECE, IT WOULD NOT CREATE SUCH SEVERE PROBLEMS FOR THE CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT AS TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR IT TO NEGOTIATE WITH FLEXIBILITY OR TO MAINTAIN ITS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CONTINUE TO PERMIT AMERICAN FACILITIES TO BE MAINTAINED ON GREEK SOIL.

WE EXPRESS DOUBT ON BOTH SCORES. THERE IS, IT SEEMS TO US, GRAVE DANGER THAT, IN THE HIGHLY POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE THAT NOW PREVAILS IN ANKARA, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD REGARD THIS MEASURE AS A VINDICATION OF ITS PAST ACTIONS AND AS REMOVING ANY PRESSURE TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE ACTION WOULD GO FAR TO UNDERCUT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND, IF NOT JEOPARDIZE ITS TENURE, AT LEAST DRIVE IT TO SUCH HARD POSITIONS AS TO MAKE THE POSSIBILITY OF FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS HIGHLY DUBIOUS.

FINALLY -- AND IN MANY WAYS THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT -- WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THIS SO-CALLED COMPROMISE WOULD CREATE A WIDESPREAD IMPRESSION THAT NO NATION THAT HAS ACQUIRED ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES NEED ANY LONGER PAY ATTENTION TO THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THOSE ARMS WERE MADE AVAILABLE BUT WOULD BE FREE TO USE THEM IN PURSUIT OF ITS OWN INTERESTS IN LOCAL CONFLICTS.

ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS COMPROMISE IS AN EFFORT TO MEET THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT  
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WILL NOT NEGOTIATE UNDER DURESS, WE DOUBT THE DESIRABILITY OF ANY SOLUTION THAT DOES NOT CONTINUE TO REQUIRE SOME PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATION AS A CONDITION TO RESUMING -- OR, AT LEAST, LONG CONTINUING -- THE ARMS FLOW. THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT THAT CAN BE MADE FOR THE PROPOSED COMPROMISE

IS THAT IT WOULD PRESERVE AMERICAN BASE RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN TURKEY, WHICH HAVE SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC VALUE; AND THAT TURKEY IS A COUNTRY WITH THREE TIMES THE GREEK POPULATION AND SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER ARMED FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT SUCH A NARROW CALCULATION ADEQUATELY COMPREHENDS THE TOTAL AMERICAN INTEREST. A DISAFFECTED GREECE WOULD MEAN A SERIOUS WEAKENING OF NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, WHILE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO UNDERMINE THE CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS WE HAVE PLACED ON THE USE OF THE WEAPONS WE HAVE PROVIDED, PARTICULARLY TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS, WHERE TENSIONS ARE HIGH AND THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT EVER PRESENT.

WE WOULD URGE THE COMMITTEE, THEREFORE, TO EXAMINE OTHER POSSIBILITIES THAT WOULD NOT APPEAR TO MAKE SUCH AN ABRUPT

REVERSAL OF THE POSITION AMERICA HAS TAKEN TOWARD THE CYPRUS ISSUE AND THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE THE WAIVER CONTAINED IN SECTION 614 (A) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED, WHICH WOULD PERMIT HIM TO AUTHORIZE THE ALLOCATION OF \$50 MILLION TO TURKEY EACH YEAR. PRESUMABLY, THE PRESIDENT COULD DO THIS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, ALTHOUGH SOME EXPRESSION OF ENCOURAGEMENT IN A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CLEAR UP ANY LEGAL QUESTIONS.

ANOTHER APPROACH WOULD BE TO SUSPEND THE LEGISLATION CUTTING OFF THE ARMS FLOW TO TURKEY FOR THREE MONTHS, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MATTER WOULD BE REVIEWED AT THE END OF THAT PERIOD TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT -- IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS -- THAT SUSPENSION SHOULD BE FURTHER EXTENDED. ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT NOT FULLY MEET TURKISH RESISTANCE TO NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS, IT WOULD NOT COMPEL THE TURKS TO ACT BEFORE

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THE ARMS FLOW IS RESUMED.

OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF VARIANTS ON ANY SUCH FORMULAE, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND SOME SOLUTION THAT WOULD NOT REPRESENT SUCH A SEVERE COMPROMISE OF THE CONDITIONS THIS GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY IMPOSED WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ARMS SHIPMENTS. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, URGE THIS COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ALL OTHER SOLUTIONS BEFORE GOING DOWN THE ROAD OF THE PROPOSED COMPROMISE WHICH COULD, IN OUR VIEW, NOT ONLY CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH, AND FOR, THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE, BUT ALSO ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE ADVENTURISM AND RESTRICT THE UNITED STATES IN DEALING WITH OTHER RECIPIENTS OF AMERICAN ARMS.

END OF TEXT. INGERSOLL

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